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ARTICLE
A simulation model shows how individual
differences affect major life decisions
Mandy A. E. van der Gaag 1,3✉, Pieter van den Berg 2,3, E. Saskia Kunnen1 & Paul L. C. van Geert1
ABSTRACT Individuals are faced with a number of major decisions throughout their lives,
including the choice of a suitable education, career, and life partner. Making such major life
decisions is challenging, as is evidenced by substantial rates of divorce and drop-out from
higher education. Although poor major life decisions can lead to considerable costs for both
individuals and society, little is known about how people make these decisions. This is
because major life decisions are not simple short-term weighings of options—they are
strongly intertwined with identity development. Here, we present a simulation model of major
life decisions that integrates the short-term perspective of decision science with the long-
term perspective of identity theory. We model major life decisions as a process comprising
many explorations of available options, resulting in changing commitments, and eventually
leading to a decision. Using our model, we run a large-scale in silico experiment, system-
atically simulating how three key individual characteristics affect the choice process and the
quality of the decision: (1) exploration tendency (broad vs. in-depth), (2) accuracy in
assessing how well options fit, and (3) selectiveness. We identify the types of individuals who
are at risk of exhibiting ‘maladaptive’ decision dynamics, including ruminative exploration and
rash decision making, and conclude that these features often, but not always, lead to bad
decisions. Our simulation results generate concrete predictions that can be empirically tested
and may eventually result in individually tailored tools to aid individuals in making major life
decisions.
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Starting in adolescence, when individuals are first faced withchoosing a career path, individuals make various major lifedecisions: high-impact decisions that typically involve a
large number of options to choose from, with an uncertain out-
come. Because the outcomes of pursuing the various available
options tend to be difficult to estimate in advance, making a
major life decision is not easy. This is evidenced by the relatively
high frequency that they turn out to be suboptimal, sometimes
with considerable negative consequences. Of course, making a
‘wrong’ decision does not always have to turn out negatively—it
can be a chance for personal growth as well—but the risks of
negative outcomes are real. For example, many young individuals,
having chosen an education programme out of hundreds or even
thousands of options, end up dropping out of tertiary education.
These dropout rates range from about one in five (Denmark) to
more than half (Italy; Quinn, 2013). This can set into motion a
series of events that put the individual at risk of becoming ‘NEET’
(Not in Employment, Education or Training; Siraj et al. 2014;
European Training Foundation, 2014) which is associated with
poor physical and mental health 20 years later (Feng et al., 2018)
and long-term employment instability that also carries societal
costs (Côte, 2015). Another example is the high rate of divorce
that is observed globally, which can also come at significantly
negative consequences for the involved individuals (Amato,
2000). Indeed, in western societies, decisions in the domain of
education are generally regretted the most, followed by decisions
in the domain of career, romantic partners, parenting, self-
improvement, and leisure activities (Roese and Summerville,
2005).
Despite the importance of major life decisions in various
domains, we still know very little about how individuals make
these choices. One important reason for this lack of under-
standing is that major life decisions take place in the grey zone
between decision making and identity development. Therefore,
the disciplines that study these two phenomena, respectively,
decision science (a field traditionally dominated by cognitive
psychology and rational choice theories from economics) and
identity science (a branch of developmental psychology), are both
insufficiently equipped to help us understand how major life
decisions are actually made. The aim of this paper is to achieve a
better understanding of major life decisions by developing a
framework that integrates these two perspectives. Because major
life decisions result from long-term processes that depend on the
complex interaction of various individual characteristics, we
decided to develop an explicit simulation model to capture the
behaviour of this process. We use our model to run a large-scale
in silico experiment, generating concrete predictions of how
individual characteristics affect the decision-making process and
its outcome. This offers opportunities for further empirical
research, and, in the longer term, may contribute to developing
strategies to intervene in major life decision processes that are at
risk of turning out poorly.
Theory
In decision science, decision making is traditionally viewed as a
(potentially biased) weighing of costs, benefits, and risks in a
single moment in time (Oppenheimer and Kelso, 2015). Although
this may be a suitable conceptualisation for various types of
simple decisions (which brand of toothpaste to buy, which stock
to invest in), this micro-perspective is ill-fitted for studying the
complex and dynamic nature of major life decisions (such as
career decisions; Pryor and Bright, 2011; Rottinghaus and Van
Esbroeck, 2011; Van der Gaag, 2017). Having said this, recent
years have seen a growing interest in approaches that
conceptualise decision making as a dynamic process (Oppen-
heimer and Kelso, 2015). This has resulted in models that treat
decision making as a sequence of basic nonlinear cognitive and
emotional processes that are under various constraints (e.g.,
Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Johnson et al., 2007), rather
than assuming a ‘black box’ psychology that is an optimisation
machine. Although these approaches are promising, they have
not yet been adapted to incorporate some of the crucial elements
of the long-term decision-making processes that characterise
major life decisions. Most importantly, these models do not take
into account that differences in individual characteristics can have
a significant impact on the process of major life decision making.
The individually variable characteristics that affect long-term
decision-making processes have received attention in identity
science for at least 50 years. Identity theorists view making major
life decisions as a process of identity development, characterised
by three main aspects: an individual explores different options
(Marcia, 1966), which results in experiences that inform the
individual how well these options fit them (Bosma and Kunnen,
2001; Grotevant, 1987; van der Gaag et al., 2017; Vleioras and
Bosma, 2005), leading the individual to adjust their commitment
towards these options (high commitment to an option makes it
likely that the individual eventually chooses it; Germeijs and
Verschueren, 2007). Identity research has identified the main
ways in which people differ across all three of these aspects (i.e.,
how individuals explore, experience and form commitments to
different options). First, there are differences between individuals
in whether they prefer to explore broadly, sampling many new
options, or prefer to explore in-depth, mainly investigating pro-
mising options further (depending on their personality; Luyckx
et al., 2006). Second, individuals differ in their information pro-
cessing style: some are more consistent than others in the inter-
pretation of their experiences relative to their notions of identity
(Berzonsky, 2004), leading to differences in how accurately
individuals can assess whether options fit their existing pre-
ferences and capabilities. Third, individuals vary in the degree of
commitment they require before making a decision; some are
very selective, only deciding when they are very committed and
sure that a decision is right for them, whereas others have a lower
selectiveness, making decisions more readily (Germeijs and
Verschueren, 2007).
Despite these major strides in understanding how individuals
vary in the way that they make major life decisions, identity
science lacks the tools to illuminate how these individual differ-
ences lead to different outcomes. This makes it hard to under-
stand the emergence of decision-making processes that have
generally been considered as ‘maladaptive’, such as rash decision
making (making decisions after too little exploration), which is
associated with low levels of academic commitment and social
adjustment (in case of career choice; Germeijs et al., 2012), and
ruminative exploration (excessive repeated exploration of the
same options; Luyckx et al., 2008), which is associated with
depression and low self-esteem (Beyers and Luyckx, 2016). The
lack of a clear way to predict how individual differences affect the
risks of exhibiting these maladaptive features of the choice pro-
cess (or indeed, of making poorly fitting decisions in general)
makes it difficult to develop clear strategies for intervening in
problematic decision-making process.
Method
In this paper, we systematically investigate how individual dif-
ferences affect the process of major life decision making by
combining the perspectives of decision science and identity sci-
ence in a simulation model. The construction of a formal model is
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useful when considering processes that are dynamic and complex
(which processes of individual development invariably are; Van
Geert, 1994), especially when attempting to understand how
multiple factors act in concert to shape the process (in our case,
how individually variable characteristics interact to shape major
life decision making). In contrast to making a verbal argument,
developing a formal model requires that assumptions are stated
explicitly and unambiguously, which in turn leads to a precise
formulation of the supposed causal relationships in the model.
This facilitates the clear-cut derivation of hypotheses from the
model outcomes, ultimately helping to design succinct empirical
studies that can test these hypotheses. Perhaps most importantly,
cementing verbal reasoning into an explicit model helps avoid
vagueness in reasoning and terminology (Courgeau et al., 2017),
which can help combat the ‘tower of babel’ that threatens to
emerge in fields like identity science (Côte, 2015). Because of
these advantages, computational approaches are being increas-
ingly used to help understand processes of individual develop-
ment (Mareschal and Thomas, 2007; Shultz, 2013; Oppenheimer
and Kelso, 2015).
Our model is implemented as a computer program (written in
C++) that simulates individual trajectories of major life decision
making based on individual characteristics (partly based on Van
der Gaag and Van den Berg, 2017). It simulates the choice process
as a series of many exploration events in which the individual
encounters various potential options, such as potential career
paths or potential romantic partners. These explorations can
either be broad or in-depth, and result in experiences that over
time improve the individual’s assessment of how well options fit
with her preferences and capabilities (in line with identity the-
ory). Eventually, if the individual estimates that an option fits her
well enough (i.e., identifies with the potential commitment), she
decides for that option (i.e., makes the commitment). We use our
model to run a large-scale in silico experiment, simulating billions
of individual major life decision trajectories, systematically
varying the individual’s exploration tendency (the balance
between broad and in-depth exploration), accuracy (how accu-
rately individuals assess whether options fit their existing pre-
ferences and capabilities), and selectiveness (how readily
individuals consider or choose options). This way, we get a sys-
tematic overview of how individual differences in these three core
identity process variables affect the dynamics and outcomes of the
choice process. Specifically, we investigate which combinations of
characteristics lead individuals to choose options that fit them
well, and which characteristics lead to the ‘maladaptive patterns’
of ruminative exploration and rash decision making. Finally, we
discuss whether these maladaptive patterns are actually associated
with poorly fitting decisions (this is still an open question in
identity research; Dietrich et al., 2012).
Figure 1 provides a general schematic overview of our model.
Any choice trajectory consists of a large number (up to 100) of
exploration events that can each be either broad or in-depth. Each
trajectory always starts with a broad exploration, in which the
individual encounters a new option that has a certain objective fit
(xo) with her preferences and capabilities. The objective fit reflects
the idea that if chosen, some options will turn out to fit an
individual better than others, under the assumption that the
individual’s preferences/capabilities and the nature of the options
do not change during the choice process. We made this
assumption for purposes of model simplicity, but we do not wish
to claim that in reality consequences of choices are completely
pre-determined. In the model, this objective fit is a constant
random number drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0
and standard deviation 1. With this implementation we assume
that options that fit very well or very poorly are relatively rare,
whereas options that have an intermediate objective fit are most
common. Individuals are not perfect in assessing how well an
option fits their preferences and capabilities. This is because
individuals are not yet fully acquainted with an option when they
first encounter it (leading them to not be able to assess its fit
perfectly), they may be subject to biases (e.g., the way an option is
presented to them may affect their assessment of its fit), or they
may simply be affected by their mood at the time they encounter
an option (possibly overestimating the fit of an option when they
are in a better mood). To reflect this, individuals have a perceived
fit (xp) that is based on the objective fit, but also contains some
error (ε):
xp ¼ xo þ ε ð1Þ
The amount of error ε depends on the accuracy (α) of the
individual: the more accurate the individual, the lower the error
component in the perceived fit. Specifically, ε is drawn from a
normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ, where
σ= 1− α. In our simulations, we consider individual differences
in α that range from 0 to 1, meaning that the most accurate
individuals (α= 1) can immediately perfectly assess the objective
fit of a new option (ε= 0) whereas the least accurate individuals
(α= 0) have an error that is drawn from the same distribution as
the objective fit itself (σ= 1), resulting in a perceived fit that is not
very informative about the objective fit of an option. Individual
differences in accuracy can be rooted in differences in informa-
tion processing styles (Berzonsky, 2004) or self-concept clarity
(Rottinghaus and Van Esbroeck, 2011; Crocetti et al., 2016) or in
the degree to which individuals are affected by cognitive biases
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Stanovich and West, 2000; Teo-
vanović et al., 2015), such as the ‘halo effect’ (e.g. Cook et al.,
2003), which muddles the evaluation of the fit of options purely
by the way in which they are presented.
Directly after exploring, the individual evaluates whether the
newly explored option fits well enough with her preferences and
capabilities to take it under consideration as an option to
potentially choose. This evaluation depends on her selectiveness,
implemented by her consideration threshold (θ1; see Fig. 1).
Specifically, if the perceived fit xp exceeds θ1, the individual will
take the option under consideration. Otherwise, she discards the
option. In our simulations, individuals can have a maximum of
three options under consideration at any point in time. If the
individual already has three options under consideration, the
newly sampled option replaces the option under consideration
that has the lowest xp (or, if it has a lower xp than all options
currently under consideration, it is discarded). By assuming that
selectiveness in choosing options is determined by aspiration
levels (and time constraints; see below), we broadly follow
existing cognitive information processing models, such as deci-
sion field theory (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Schwartz
et al., 2002), and identity theory (by incorporating a process of
commitment making that is separate from identification with
commitment; Luyckx et al., 2006).
As soon as an individual has any options under consideration,
she may also explore in depth, further investigating previously
explored options, in addition to more broad exploration to
sample new options. The balance between broad and in-depth
exploration is determined by the individual’s exploration tendency
(m), which is bound between 0 and 1: whenever the individual
explores, she has a probability m to engage in broad exploration,
and probability 1−m to engage in in-depth exploration (see Fig.
1). The distinction between these two types of exploration is
abundantly supported by many studies on career choice and
identity development (e.g., Gati and Asher, 2001; Luyckx et al.,
2006; Porfeli and Skorikov, 2010), as is the fact that individuals
differ in how much they engage in either type of exploration
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(Klimstra et al., 2012; Luyckx et al., 2014). If the individual
engages in in-depth exploration, one of the options that are
currently under consideration is selected at random, and the
individual has a new experience with this option. Based on this
experience, the perceived fit xp of this option is updated. The
updated perceived fit (xp’) depends on the previous perceived fit
(xp) as follows:
x0p ¼
xpkr þ xo þ ε
kr þ 1 ð2Þ
where k denotes the number of times the option has already been
explored in the past, r represents a recency factor, determining
the relative importance of past experiences (r= 0.5 for all simu-
lations shown), and ε is an uncertainty component associated
with the current experience, drawn from a normal distribution
with mean 0 and standard deviation σ (reflecting the individual’s
accuracy, see above). The use of the factor k ensures that the
relative impact of the current experience (represented by xo+ ε)
on the perceived fit is lower if the option has already been
explored many times before. Additionally, the use of recency
factor r ensures that more recent experiences are weighed more
heavily than experiences further in the past (Davelaar et al.,
2005). After xp has been updated through in-depth exploration,
the individual again evaluates whether she will keep the option
under consideration (depending on her selectiveness, see above).
At the end of each time step (after broad-depth or in-depth
exploration has taken place), the individual determines whether
the fit of the option is good enough to make her final choice for it.
Again, this depends on her selectiveness, in this case implemented
by her decision threshold (θ2; see Fig. 1). If xp exceeds θ2 (and for
as long as this remains the case), the individual will enter the
mode of final decision making. When in this mode, at the start of
each time step, the individual has a probability c (the confidence
factor; for all results shown, c= 0.5) to make the final decision for
the option exceeding θ2. With the complementary probability (1–
c), the individual will explore this option in depth. This continues
until either the final decision is made (in which case the simu-
lation ends), or in-depth exploration has caused the perceived fit
(xp) of the option to decrease to a value below θ2, in which case
the individual enters back into the regular mode of decision
making. The implementation of a mode of final decision making
reflects the possibility that individuals desire to accumulate more
evidence to increase their confidence before making the final
decision (i.e., post-decisional processing of confidence judge-
ments as proposed in the two-stage dynamic signal detection
theory; Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010). If the choice process
reaches time step 100 without having reached a decision, the
individual simply chooses the option currently under considera-
tion that has the best perceived fit. If there are no options under
consideration at this point (for example, because of a very large
value of θ1), the individual chooses a randomly sampled option.
We systematically investigated the impact of individuals’
exploration tendency (m), their accuracy in assessing the fit of
options (α), and their selectiveness (θ1 and θ2) on the decision-
making process. To do this, we ran a large number of simulations
across a broad range of parameter combinations: 160,000 com-
binations of m, α, θ1 and θ2, and 25,000 replicate simulations for
each parameter combination investigated (totalling 4 billion
Fig. 1 The structure of the major life decisions simulation model. We model major life decisions as a process built up from many exploration events,
encompassing both broad exploration (in which a new option is investigated) and in-depth exploration (in which individuals gain more experience with an
option they are already considering). The individual characteristic exploration tendency (m) determines how likely an individual is to engage in either broad
exploration (with probability m) or in-depth exploration (with probability 1–m) at any given point in time. Both types of exploration result in an experience
with an option, which leads to a perception of how well the explored option fits with the individual’s interests and capabilities (xp). This ‘perceived fit’ is
partly dependent on the inherent ‘objective fit’ of an option, but it is also affected by the individual’s accuracy (α) in assessing the fit of options. If the
perceived fit of a recently explored option does not meet the standards of the individual—this depends on the individual’s selectiveness (specifically, the
consideration threshold, θ1)—the option is discarded from the set of options under consideration, and the individual again engages in exploration.
Conversely, if the perceived fit of an option is high enough (also depending on the individual’s selectiveness; the decision threshold θ2), the individual
enters the mode of final decision making, likely leading the decision making process to its end. If the objective fit of the newly explored option neither falls
short of θ1 nor exceeds θ2, the option is kept under consideration and the individual explores again.
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simulated choice trajectories; Fig. 2 shows three representative
examples). Specifically, we varied m from 0.001 to 0.2 (in incre-
ments of 0.001), α between 0.0 and 1.0 (in increments of 0.005),
θ1 between 0.0 and 1.0, and θ2 between 1.5 and 2.5. For each
parameter combination, we tracked how many times individuals
on average explored single options (giving us a way to assess the
maladaptive choice processes of ruminative exploration and rash
decision making) and recorded the average objective fit of the
option that was finally chosen (allowing us to determine the
quality of the choices that are eventually made).
Results
Figure 3 gives a complete overview of the outcomes of our
simulations of individual major life decision-making trajectories,
for a large range of combinations in individual characteristics.
The figure shows how exploration tendency (m), accuracy (α) and
selectiveness (consideration threshold θ1 and decision threshold
θ2) affect the quality of the choice (Fig. 3a), the total time it takes
to make a decision (i.e., degree of rash decision making; Fig. 3b),
and the average time spent exploring each option under con-
sideration (i.e., degree of rumination; Fig. 3c) in our simulations.
Figure 3a reveals that the objective fit of the options chosen by the
individuals in our simulations does not always follow from their
individual characteristics in a straightforward manner. Generally
speaking, high selectiveness (high consideration [θ1] or decision
threshold [θ2]) tends to lead to better decisions, as does a strong
tendency to explore broadly (high m), and a high degree of
accuracy (high α). Conversely, the combination of low standards
for deeming an option worthy of considering (low θ1) and a
tendency to explore options mostly in-depth (low m) tends to
lead to decisions that yield relatively poor decisions (low objective
fit). Having said that, it is not true that broad exploration is
always better than in-depth exploration, that it is always good to
have high standards, or even that it is best to be as accurate as
possible when estimating the fit of an option. For example, our
model predicts that relatively inaccurate individuals make the best
choices if they explore mainly in depth, whereas relatively accu-
rate individuals make better choices if they engage in more broad
exploration (see red lines in Fig. 3a).
In our simulations, less accurate individuals tend to make their
decisions more quickly than more accurate individuals (Fig. 3b).
This happens because less accurate individuals perceive more
variation in the fit of options, and are therefore more likely to
perceive any given option as fitting either very poorly or very well.
This fits with our model prediction that individuals with low
accuracy make better decisions if they explore more in depth (red
lines in Fig. 3a); because these individuals risk making bad
choices based on an inaccurate view of the fit of the options they
encounter, they are better off evaluating options more often to
obtain a more accurate picture. This is especially true for indi-
viduals with a low decision threshold (θ2= 1.5), who are most at
risk of making rash decisions (i.e., coming to a decision after
fewer than 20 explorations). A comparison of Fig. 3a with Fig. 3b
reveals that rash decision making generally leads to relatively
poor outcomes in our model. Extremely short decision times
(fewer than 10 explorations) hardly occur, but when they do, the
objective fit of the chosen option tends to be below the decision
threshold, meaning that the individual chooses an option that
they would probably not have chosen if they would have explored
in depth more often. However, our simulation results also predict
that quick decisions are not always bad; relatively accurate indi-
viduals (α > 0.5) that are not very selective (θ2= 1.5) can reach
satisfactory outcomes with quick decisions.
Figure 3c shows that rumination (where individuals explore the
same option at least 10 times) only occurs in our model when
individuals have a strong tendency to engage in in-depth
exploration (m < 0.1). This is particularly the case for generally
selective individuals (θ1= 1.0 and θ2= 2.5). Like rash decision
making, ruminative exploration in our simulations often leads to
bad choices, but not always. Although high levels of rumination
are associated with very poor decisions if individuals readily take
options under consideration (θ1= 0.0), this effect is not as clear
for individuals with a high consideration threshold (θ1= 1.0). For
example, for individuals who are generally selective (θ1= 1.0 and
θ2= 2.5) and have low accuracy (α < 0.5), rumination hardly
affects the quality of the choice that is eventually made (compare
Fig. 3a, c). Figure 4 shows that simulated ruminative choice tra-
jectories can not only have a mildly positive effect on decision
quality for individuals with low accuracy (α= 0.0), but also have
the beneficial effect that it reduces the variance in the quality of
the decision that is made, thereby preventing very bad choices.
Specifically, our model predicts that non-ruminative decision
trajectories of individuals with low accuracy have a considerable
risk of resulting in choices with an objective fit below θ1 (i.e.,
Fig. 2 The simulated decision trajectories of three different individuals a–c.
The objective and perceived fit of choice options are represented by pairs of
lines of matching colours. Stable, dashed lines represent the objective fit
(xo) of an option (which is always constant). The (colour-matched)
fluctuating, solid lines represent the perceived fit of that same option (xp,
which changes as a result of in-depth exploration of that option). When the
perceived fit of an option enters the red area (xp > θ2) the individual enters
the mode of final decision making for that option. A decision is indicated
with a vertical, dotted line (for example in a at t= 28—for illustrative
purposes, we have continued these simulations even when a decision was
already made). An option is discarded when its perceived fit enters the blue
area (xp < θ1; for example the yellow option in c at t= 22). The symbols at
the bottom of each graph indicate the event that occurred in each time
step. Black circles represent broad exploration events; a new pair of
coloured lines start at that time point if the newly explored option has a
high enough perceived fit. Coloured squares represent events of in-depth
exploration (the colour of the square indicates which option was explored
in depth). The exploration tendency is different for each of the three
simulated career trajectories: m= 0.5 a, m= 0.2 b, and m= 0.1 c. The other
parameters are constant for these simulations (accuracy α= 0.5,
selectiveness θ1= 1.0, θ2= 2.0).
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choices for options that these individuals should in principle not
even be willing to consider). The fraction of such very bad
decisions is much reduced if these individuals ruminate more
(compare the pair of leftmost histograms in Fig. 4).
Discussion
In sum, although the outcomes of our model often depend on the
parameters in complex ways, a number of general patterns
emerge from our model. Our model predicts that the best deci-
sions are generally made by individuals who are highly accurate
in evaluating how well an option will fit them, who have high
standards for making their final decision, and who tend to
broadly explore many options to acquaint themselves with pos-
sible alternatives. Additionally, rash decision making and rumi-
nation tend to have negative effects on the quality of the decision
that is made. Having said that, our model also predicts that
individual characteristics (exploration tendency, accuracy and
selectiveness) and choice process characteristics (rash decision
making and rumination) rarely have a straightforward impact on
the quality of major life decisions, and that their effects are
sometimes counter-intuitive. This shows the value of simulation
approaches in producing consistent formulations of theory and
generating testable hypotheses that one would not have arrived at
by verbal reasoning alone.
Our study provides a concrete demonstration of how a formal
modelling approach can clarify assumptions and definitions that
were previously implicit or unclear. This is especially important
when integrating distinct research traditions (in our case, decision
science and identity theory): a formal modelling approach requires
that concepts from different (sub)disciplines are placed in a single
framework, thus forcing a substantive conceptual integration. For
example, ruminative exploration is a concept from identity science
that did not yet have a clear counterpart within decision science.
Our formal modelling approach forced us to include this concept in
our process-oriented decision-making framework in an explicit
way. This led us to conceptualise ruminative exploration as an
Fig. 3 An overview of (a) the objective fit of the final decision, (b) the time it takes before a decision is made and (c) the time individuals spend ruminating,
depending on a broad range of parameter combinations. The four panels within each of these subplots show a combination of two consideration thresholds
(θ1) and two decision thresholds (θ2). Within each of these four panels, the exploration tendency (m, on the x-axis) and accuracy (α, on the y-axis) vary
(between 0 and 1 in steps of 0.01). In figure a, colours (and black contour lines) indicate the objective fit of the chosen option for each parameter
combination. The red lines indicate which exploration tendency leads to the best decisions (i.e., the choice of options with the highest objective fit),
depending on the accuracy. In figure b, the colours and contour lines indicate the number of time steps that have passed before the decision is made. In
figure c, they indicate the average number of time steps options are explored in depth. The graphs show averages over 25,000 replicate simulation runs for
each parameter combination.
Fig. 4 Vertical histograms showing the distribution of the objective fit
(xo) of career choices, for low accuracy (α= 0.0) and high accuracy
(α= 0.5). For both levels of accuracy, separate histograms are shown for
simulation runs that had a low degree of rumination (where options were
explored in-depth <10 times on average; in dark grey) and simulation runs
that had a high degree of rumination (an average of at least 10 in-depth
exploration events per option; in light grey). Black lines show the average
objective fit associated with each histogram. The red-shaded area shows
the region that is above the decision threshold (θ2= 2.0); the blue-shaded
area shows the region that is below the consideration threshold (θ1= 1.0).
All histograms are based on an exploration tendency of m= 0.1 (i.e., a
tendency to explore mainly in depth). The graph is based on 1,000,000
replicate simulation runs for both values of accuracy.
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emergent outcome of the choice process (where individuals
repeatedly explore the same option), rather than a priori assuming
it to be a distinct type of exploration (as it is usually considered in
identity science; see e.g. Luyckx et al., 2008).
Our formal modelling approach has not only been instru-
mental in integrating elements from distinct research traditions; it
has also forced us to closely scrutinise some concepts from
identity theory, leading to some clarifying insights. For example,
identity theorists typically consider commitment and exploration
to be distinct processes, but explicitly formalising decision mak-
ing as a dynamic process has compelled us to re-evaluate that
notion. In our model, commitment emerges as a result of the fit of
an option on the one hand, and the selectiveness on the other. A
certain level of commitment to an option is necessary in order to
drive an individual to explore it in depth: only if the option seems
fitting enough (given individual’s standards), the individual will
explore it again. This provides an interesting micro-process-level
explanation for the finding that in-depth exploration is often
correlated with both making a commitment and identifying with
it (Luyckx et al., 2006), and suggests that exploration and com-
mitment are much more intimately intertwined than commonly
assumed. Similarly, our assumption that individuals cannot
explore options indefinitely implies that they have to decide how
much of their time they invest in broad exploration vs. in-depth
exploration. Our simulation results show that this balance
between both types of exploration is not trivial—it has con-
siderable implications for the outcome of the choice process.
However, this trade-off has not yet received attention in empirical
studies on identity exploration. We do not claim that our views
on these processes of exploration and commitment are necessarily
better than others, but our approach does take a step closer to
making definitions more explicit and coherent.
Our simulation model has generated a number of novel
hypotheses that can be tested empirically. For example, our
results shed light on the potential costs associated with ‘mala-
daptive’ features of major life decision making, such as rumina-
tive exploration and rash decision making, which have thus far
remained elusive (Dietrich et al., 2012). We predict that these
features are in most cases damaging to the quality of the choice
that is made, but that they can be beneficial in some cases. For
individuals who are inaccurate in assessing how well options fit
with their existing capabilities and preferences, we predict that
ruminative exploration reduces the risk of making very bad
decisions. For individuals who are not too selective, we predict
that rash decision making is an efficient way to make a fast and
satisfactory choice. Person centred empirical studies can be
designed to test these predictions.
If the hypotheses generated by our model turn out to be
empirically supported, they may eventually be helpful to inform
practice. Our model has two distinct advantages in this regard.
First, it is explicitly formulated on the individual level, which is
the level that practitioners operate on. This means that empirical
insights based on the hypotheses derived from our model have
the potential to aid counsellors in tailoring their choice support
strategies to the individual characteristics of their client. For
example, our simulation results suggest that individuals who are
not very sure about what they like or are good at may reach better
decisions if they are stimulated to explore a few options in depth,
rather than to explore many options broadly. This may be par-
ticularly helpful for the guidance of adolescents who have to make
important education decisions, since adolescents tend to have
lower self-concept clarity than adults (Crocetti et al., 2016).
Second, our model explicitly integrates two elements that are both
likely to be important in shaping counselling strategies around
major life decisions: shorter-term mechanisms of decision making
and longer-term patterns of identity development. For example,
as we described above, counsellors may recommend a type of
long-term exploration strategy that is suitable to that individual,
but they may also attempt to improve micro-level dynamics, such
as helping the individual estimate the fit of an option more
accurately. Of course, such practical applications are still far off;
the hypotheses generated by our model first have to be tested.
As any model, our model has not included all parameters that
may affect the phenomenon of interest. In this study, we have
chosen to limit ourselves to three factors (exploration tendency,
accuracy and selectiveness), which are considered to be of proximal
influence on the three key characteristics of the process of major life
decision making, and which studies on identity development have
revealed to differ considerably between individuals. However, this
does not mean that we consider the influence of other factors to be
unimportant. For example, a high degree of social support can
perhaps enhance the accuracy with which individuals estimate the
fit of options. Extensions of the model that include other factors
may be valuable, provided that they do not complicate the model to
such an extent that the results become uninterpretable. In similar
vein, we chose to investigate the effect of some parameters by
varying them across many different levels (exploration tendency,
consistency), whereas we only considered a few levels of other
parameters (both selectiveness thresholds), and held other factors
entirely constant (e.g. the time allotted to make the final decision
[100 time steps], the maximum number of options individuals
could have under consideration simultaneously [three], and the
relative weight of past experiences). We did not hold these values
constant because we think they will not significantly affect the
process of major life decision making—we simply chose to focus
our study on the effects of factors that are of immediate influence
on the three key characteristics of identity development processes.
Depending on the question at hand (or simply to further explore
model behaviour), it may be interesting to run simulations in which
some other parameters are varied, or in which the same parameters
are varied over a different range of values.
In our model, we make the implicit assumption that indivi-
duals assess the fit of options by comparing them to some kind of
constant picture of their own interests and capabilities. In reality,
it is likely that exploration also drives identity development by
allowing individuals to learn about their own interests and cap-
abilities, potentially leading them to become more accurate in the
interpretations of the experiences that they have. One promising
direction to extend our model is to explicitly incorporate this
development in the exploration process—this would be particu-
larly fitting for approximating decision-making processes that
span long time periods (months or years). This could be done by
allowing accuracy to improve over time, potentially in reaction to
the options that individuals have explored.
Similarly, our implementation of ‘objective fit’ as a uni-
dimensional, constant number that is drawn from a normal
distribution is a choice that is convenient for modelling purposes.
It reflects the assumption that the fit between individual and a
major life decision is indicative for the quality of the decision, and
that this fit is relatively constant on the short term. However, in
reality, it is likely that the quality of a decision depends on more
than a single fit-factor and that the fit of an option can change
over time, both because of various types of changes in the indi-
vidual (such as identity development) and with changes in the
option. Other, more refined assumptions on this are conceivable,
and may be worth exploring. Also, depending on the type of
major life decision that is being made, the properties of the pool
of possible options might differ in various regards, such as the
number of options that are available and the degree to which the
suitability of options differs. Of course, our assumption of an
infinite pool of options with normally distributed objective fit is
highly artificial, and it might affect the predicted outcome of the
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decision-making process. In any future efforts in modelling a
specific type of major life decision making, this would be one of
the more obvious opportunities to include more realism. Finally,
we have assumed that the way individuals perceive the fit of
options is absolute (i.e., it only depends on that option itself).
However, there are reasons to suppose that individuals perceive
the fit of an option as relative, dependent on the fit of other
options they are considering (Stewart et al., 2006). Empirical work
can help us to gain more insight in how individuals perceive the
fit of options, and can serve to refine our model.
In our model, we have implemented a clear-cut divide between
exploring an option and deciding on an option. This may be a
more realistic assumption for some decisions than for others. For
example, in the case of career choice this may be relatively rea-
listic because there is a clear moment where the exploration phase
ends and a decision is implemented by accepting a job or starting
an educational trajectory. For other decisions this may be less
realistic, such as in partner choice, where the transition from
exploring an option to deciding on that partner may be more
vague. However, also in this case, multiple decision moments are
present: for example, an individual may choose a certain way to
define the relationship when talking about it to others, or may
choose to cohabit with and/or marry the partner.
Major life decisions result from a complex and dynamic
choice process. The explicitly dynamic framework that we have
introduced can help develop theory on how this process
unfolds, and can serve to generate hypotheses that can be
empirically tested. A number of predictions can be derived
from the concrete model implementation that we have pre-
sented, including on how we should expect individual char-
acteristics (exploration tendency, accuracy and selectiveness) to
affect decision quality, and on under what circumstances we
should expect the ‘maladaptive’ phenomena of rash decision
making and ruminative exploration to emerge and when these
are actually beneficial to the quality of the choices that are
made. More generally, our model should be considered as a first
step in a new direction of formally derived hypotheses,
empirical tests of these hypotheses, and subsequent improve-
ment of model assumptions. This approach has the potential to
lead us to a better understanding of how these important
decision-making processes work, and to eventually allow the
design of individually tailored strategies to help individuals
navigate these challenging major life decisions.
Data availability
The C++ code of the simulation model is publicly available on
https://github.com/pvdberg1/major_life_decisions. This simula-
tion model generates the data that was analysed in this paper. All
R-scripts that produce the graphs are available on request.
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